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PREPARATORY NEGLIGENCE
Robert Heidt*
This Essay discusses the appropriate significance in tort law of a
negligent attempt to perform an injurious activity when the evidence is
insufficient to show the actual performance of the activity was negligent.
The author calls such a negligent attempt uncoupled with sufficient evidence
of negligent performance "preparatory negligence." An example would be
driving a car when one is so inebriated that the decision to drive is negligent
but those injured in a subsequent accident are unable to show the inebriated
driver's actual driving was negligent. The author argues that preparatory
negligence alone should never warrant tort liability. Rather, those injured
must show negligence in some aspect of the performance of the activity.
The least confusing way to describe this rule in terms of the usual elements
of negligence liability is to hold that preparatory negligence alone is never a
proximate cause of injury. But because a person's preparatory negligence
often increases the likelihood that his performance of his activity was
negligent, the author describes some circumstances when preparatory
negligence provides relevant and admissible evidence of negligent
performance and on that ground should come to the attention of the fact
finder.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a type of negligence which, for lack of a more euphonious
name, I call preparatory negligence. It consists of creating an
unreasonable risk of injury to others by undertaking (i.e., attempting to
perform) an activity a person knows or should know he is not qualified
to perform with reasonable safety.' Examples include driving while
drunk or while visually impaired, or performing a medical procedure or
piloting a passenger plane without any training and without satisfying
B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, J.D., University of Wisconsin.
1.
I am assuming that there is no emergency, broadly defined, that would
justify defendant's otherwise negligent attempt. By "emergency" I mean any scenario
outside the ordinary where the utility of, say, driving despite knowing one is drunk is
so great that it swamps the substantial risks created by such driving.
*
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the requirements that help to assure reasonable safety.2 Perhaps
surprisingly, preparatory negligence is closely related to another type of
negligence familiar to every tort student, sometimes called enabling
negligence, such as negligent entrustment of one's car to a dangerous
driver, and negligent hiring or retention of inappropriately dangerous
employees.' It is also closely related to some further examples of
negligent facilitation of culpable behavior by others. Examples include
negligently serving alcohol to a person who is obviously both drunk and
about to drive and who then is involved in a car accident that injures
another, or negligently leaving unlocked on a public street a car which
is then stolen and involved in an accident that injures another. The
close relation lies in a common issue these types of negligence present:
what is the legal significance, if any, of this negligence when the

defendant's activity results in injury to another, but the evidence is not
sufficient to establish that the actualperformance of the activity by the
defendant or the enabled third party (e.g., the driving, as opposed to
the attempt to drive while drunk in the first place) was negligent,
reckless,
intentionally wrongful,
or otherwise unreasonably
dangerous?'
2.
Notice that in these examples the preparatory negligence plainly does
increase a risk of harm. It invariably increases the odds that the subsequent
performance by defendant (e.g. his driving) will be less safe. This Essay is not
concerned with what might be called "technically criminal preparatory behavior" which
does not in any way affect the risk that defendant's performance will be less safe. So,
for example, practicing medicine when a doctor lacks a license only because he has not
yet satisfied the state's residency requirement is not preparatory negligence as the term
is used here. Nor would be driving a car when a person's license is no longer valid
only because he has not renewed it in a state in which the renewal process involves no
testing, monitoring, or filtering of drivers for safety purposes whatsoever. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288 (1965) (criteria for assessing
significance of statutory violations in a civil case).
3.
See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435,
436-43 (1999) (discussing enabling torts and assuming implicitly that the defendant
enabler will only be liable if the third party's performance of the activity is culpable or
otherwise unreasonably dangerous). On negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, see
1 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 7:3
(rev. ed. 1994).
4.
"Unreasonably dangerous" may seem redundant but it is needed because
the performance of the activity may be unreasonably dangerous and yet not culpable.
An example would be a car driver who suffers a sudden heart attack, stroke, epileptic
seizure, or bout of insanity and thus drives head on into opposing traffic. In these
examples, courts agree that even though the defendant driver's sudden incapacity frees
him from culpability for his poor driving performance, any preparatory negligence in
deciding to drive with knowledge of his special susceptibility to such sudden incapacity
should trigger liability as long as the driving, objectively considered, was unreasonably
dangerous. Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 540-44, 173 N.W.2d
619 (1970). In Breumg, the defendant's preparatory negligence lay in her decision,
while lucid, to attempt to drive knowing that she was occasionally having visions that
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Part I below discusses the polar extremes of affording preparatory
negligence either no significance or dispositive significance. By
dispositive significance I mean allowing prima facie liability to those
injured by defendant to be predicated on preparatory negligence alone.
Part I also reviews the significance courts have afforded preparatory
negligence when they have addressed it. Parts II and III argue for what
I contend is the proper significance. Part II argues against affording
preparatory negligence dispositive significance, and Part III argues for
allowing it to be admitted as evidence of negligent performance under
certain circumstances.
I. PART ONE

Most authorities accord preparatory negligence no significance
whatsoever, holding that it constitutes neither ground for liability to the
injured plaintiff nor evidence relevant to any element of that liability.
Hence, it should never come to the attention of the fact finder. 5 The
Third Restatement of Torts posits the case where a motorist rear ends a
defendant drunken driver who is waiting in traffic with the result that
some further person, such as the defendant's passenger or the driver of

created an unreasonable risk she would drive dangerously. Id. That preparatory
negligence was a sufficient basis for liability when she drove over the centerline into
plaintiff. 1d. Although driving over the centerline was unreasonably dangerous, no
culpability attached to that driving because her visions at that moment rendered her
incapable of proper driving. Id.
This Essay does not deal with cases like Breunig where all parties agree that the
performance of the activity was "unreasonably dangerous." See id. at 539. In such
cases the law already accords dispositive significance to defendant's preparatory
negligence in attempting an activity with forewarning that his condition is unusually
likely to render him incapable of performing the activity with reasonable safely. Rather,
this Essay deals with cases where plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that
defendant's performance of his activity was "unreasonably dangerous."
5.
E.g., Phass v. MacClenathen, 85 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644-46 (N.Y. App. Div.
1948) (stating that preparatory negligence is irrelevant); Westfall v. Kottke, 110 Wis.
2d 86, 105-06, 328 N.W.2d 481 (1983) (stating that preparatory negligence in failure
to secure a license is irrelevant); Leahy v. Kenosha Mem7 Hosp., 118 Wis. 2d 441,
448-51, 348 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that preparatory negligence in
violating a statute limiting those who could treat patient is irrelevant); Charles 0.
Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
622, 625-34, 641-42 (1951); Larry D. Scheafer, Liability of One Who Sells Gun to
Child for Injury to Third Party, 4 A.L.R.4th 331, 332, 337-38 (1981). The denial of
significance to preparatory negligence stretches back in time. See Brown v. Buffalo &
State Line R.R. Co., 22 N.Y. 191, 195-99 (1860); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF
TORTS 653 (1879). The British rule is similar. In re The Empire Jamaica, [1955] P. 52,
57-59 (U.K.) (stating that preparatory negligence of ship's captain is irrelevant); see
also H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 119-20 (2d ed. 1985).
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the car in front of the defendant, is injured.6 The Restatement editors

conclude that the defendant's negligence in driving drunk should not
lead to his liability to the plaintiff injured in the accident and,
furthermore, should be deemed irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence
in any suit involving the accident.7 It follows from the Restatement's
example that that the negligence of the defendant-owner of a car who
knowingly entrusted his car to a drunken driver who was subsequently
rear ended would likewise be irrelevant in any suit brought by a
plaintiff injured in the accident. Equally irrelevant would be the
negligence of the defendant who knowingly served alcohol to a drunk

who thereafter drove and was rear ended. Presumably, the same
reasoning would also deem irrelevant the negligence of the defendant
car owner in leaving his car unlocked, provided that the car thief, like

the drunken driver, was rear ended in an accident injuring the plaintiff.
The Restatement editors suggest in their hypothetical that a plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie negligence case, no matter how drunk
defendant was, when defendant's performance of his driving was not
negligent. The editors elsewhere imply that plaintiff should establish a

prima facie case whenever defendant's performance of his driving was
negligent,' no matter how sober and otherwise qualified to drive
defendant was. Given the above, one might think that defendant's
preparatory negligence in opting to drive while drunk, and defendant's
preparatory behavior generally, will neverbe relevant.

Perhaps the most famous case, for so nullifying the legal
significance of preparatory negligence is Brown v. Shyne.9 There the
6.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
§ 14 cmt. h (2010).
7.
Id. Although the Restatement is silent on the matter, the editors plainly
assumed in their hypothetical that the driver's negligence in being drunk did not reduce
his chance of avoiding injury to the plaintiff by, for example, slowing down his ability
to swerve or to brake. See id. Likewise, the editors evidently assumed the driver's
negligence in being drunk in no way increased the plaintiff's injuries. See id.
The Restatement was not dealing with the issue of whether the drunk driver's
preparatory negligence would be relevant to a contributory negligence claim should the
drunk driver be injured and sue the person who negligently rear ended him. See id. The
logic of the Restatement approach would deem the drunkenness irrelevant to the
driver's contributory negligence and, hence, would not deem the drunken driver guilty
of contributory negligence. See id.
8.
To be precise, the Restatement says that plaintiff will establish a prima
facie case whenever defendant's driving performance was negligent and that negligence
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury and within the scope of liability. See id. § 6.
9.
151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1926). Virtually all editors of torts casebooks touch
on preparatory negligence in treating Brown and in treating more generally the issue of
when courts should displace "ordinary care" as the test for negligence with a statutory,
regulatory, or administrative rule. E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 273-77 (9th ed. 2008). Editors could also treat Brown and touch on
HARM
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defendant's preparatory negligence consisted of attempting to provide
medical treatment to the plaintiff-patient even though defendant had
never attended medical school or taken the examinations New York
required of licensed physicians.'" The plaintiff sued the defendant for
negligence, and the jury found the defendant liable, awarding
$10,000.1 While the defendant's criminal liability for practicing
medicine without a license was clear, the issue there, as in this paper,
was the significance to the plaintiffs tort case of the defendant's
criminal attempt to practice medicine (behavior that must have been
intentionally wrongful). 2 On appeal it was assumed that but for the
defendant's attempt to treat the plaintiff, the plaintiff would not have
suffered the injury for which she was suing-paralysis. 3 Indeed, that
connection between defendant's preparatory negligence and plaintiffs
injury, which I somewhat contentiously call the "but for" connection,
can be assumed to exist in all preparatory negligence cases. Writing for
the Court of Appeals, Justice Irving Lehman reversed the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff, finding reversible error in one of the trial court's jury
instructions.' 4 That instruction, Lehman held, wrongly accorded
significance to defendant's preparatory negligence. 5 The erroneous
instruction said:
If the defendant attempted to treat the plaintiff and to adjust
the vertebrTe in her spine when he did not possess the
requisite knowledge and skill as prescribed by the [licensing]
statute to know what was proper and necessary to do under
the circumstances, or how to do it, even if he did know what
to do, you can find him negligent.' 6

preparatory negligence when they treat the issue of "proximate cause," or, as the Third
Restatement calls it, the issue of "scope of liability." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010).
10.
Brown, 151 N.E. at 197-98.
11.
Id.at 198.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.at 198-99.
14.
Id.at 197-99.
15.
Id.at 198.
16.
Id. Granted, the instruction would not err if one interprets it as allowing
liability only upon a jury finding that defendant in the performance of his treatment of
plaintiff did not do what was proper and necessary to do, or even if he did do what was
proper and necessary to do, he did not do it in the proper and necessary manner. So
interpreted, the instruction would ground liability on the defendant's performance of his
negligent treatment rather than his mere attempt to perform and hence is unexceptional
and irreproachable. The error of the instruction, as Lehman said, lies in allowing
liability to be based solely on a wrongful attempt to perform treatment. See id.
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In finding this instruction erroneous, Lehman held, in effect, that
the only theories of negligence on which plaintiff could reach the jury
and prevail (i.e., the only theories of negligence which would be, in
Lehman's words, a "proximate cause" of plaintiffs injury) 7 would be
negligence in the actual performance of defendant's medical
treatment. 18 Examples would be negligence in how the defendant
manipulated plaintiff's spine, or negligence in deciding to manipulate
plaintiffs spine (i.e., negligent diagnoses). According to Lehman, a
plaintiff can only reach the jury and prevail by adducing sufficient
evidence of one of those theories of negligence.' 9 Any preparatory
negligence by the defendant based on defendant's attempt to treat the
plaintiff while knowing that he was not qualified to treat or that his
treating created an unreasonable risk of injury to the patient was,
17.
Id. While Lehman denied preparatory negligence any significance on the
ground that it was not a "proximate cause" of plaintiffs injury, other courts deny
preparatory negligence significance on the grounds that it was not a cause-in-fact of
plaintiffs injury. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAR. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. h (2010) (no cause-in-fact); Massey v.Wright, 447 So. 2d
169 (Ala. 1984) (no cause-in-fact); Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So. 2d 567 (Miss. 1997)
(no cause-in-fact). Other courts deny preparatory negligence any significance on the
ground of "no duty." E.g., Sabina v. Yavapai Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 993 P.2d
1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (no duty); Scovill v.City of Astoria, 921 P.2d 1312 (Or.
1996) (no duty). This multiplicity of grounds for denying significance to preparatory
negligence breeds confusion. I contend the least confusing ground is to say that
defendant's preparatory negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
I do not find helpful the claim that preparatory negligence is irrelevant because it
is not a cause-in-fact. I call for resisting locutions that dismiss preparatory negligence
on this ground. One example of such a locution is: there is no cause-in-fact because the
particular characteristic of the defendant or the third party (e.g., the drunkenness) was
not a but-for cause of the plaintiffs injury. See Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 431 A.2d 76,
85 (Md. 1981) (dicta). Another example would be: while the defendant's medical
treatment in Brown might have been a but-for cause of plaintiffs paralysis, the
defendant's negligence in attempting that treatment without training was not a but-for
cause unless the treatment was performed negligently. A further example would be:
there is no cause-in-fact because the plaintiff would have been injured just as he was
had the defendant been perfectly qualified.
Accepting that cause-in-fact is satisfied simply because plaintiff would not have
been injured but for defendant's negligent attempt better avoids confusion. See Clarence
Morris, The Relation of CriminalStatutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv. 453, 474
(1933) (criticizing the claim that such negligence is not a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs
injury).
18.
See Brown, 151 N.E. at 199 ("In order to show that the plaintiff has been
injured by defendant's breach of the statutory duty, proof must be given that defendant
in such treatment did not exercise the care and skill which would have been exercised
by qualified practitioners within the state, and that such lack of skill and care caused the
injury.").
19.
See id.at 198. Naturally, the plaintiff in Brown would also need to show
cause-in-fact, namely, that but for defendant's negligent performance plaintiff would
probably not have been injured. But the appeal in Brown did not concern this element.
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Lehman insisted, "irrelevant. 20 Such preparatory negligence,
therefore, should not be admitted into evidence nor otherwise come to
the attention of the jury. The editors of the Third Restatement of Torts
appear to endorse Lehman's approach in Brown:
"In light, then, of the combination of the statutory-purpose
doctrine and ordinary principles of scope of liability, the lack
of a license is not negligence per se on the part of the actor,
nor is it evidence tending to show the actor's negligence. ,21
The reasoning for denying significance to preparatory negligence
is familiar to every tort student once he is introduced to "proximate
cause," now called by the Third Restatement of Torts "scope of
liability." 22 "Defendant's preparatory negligence was not a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury," the (admittedly exceptional) student will
insist, "because the unreasonable risks it created, and which led us to
deem it negligent, are that the activity which defendant attempted or set
in motion will be performed in a culpable or, if not culpable,
unreasonably dangerous manner. The drunk, the car thief, and the
insane driver who the defendant negligently entrusted to drive, will
drive in an unreasonably dangerous fashion. The ex-con who defendant
negligently employed or retained will use his employment to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others. The impostor-doctor and impostorpilot will practice medicine or pilot the plane so poorly that injury to
others becomes unreasonably likely. But in the absence of evidence
(other than the preparatory negligence itself) 23 of such culpable or
otherwise unreasonably dangerous performance of the activity-in the
absence of other evidence that one of these risks for which we deem
defendant's preparatory behavior negligent materialized in injury to the
plaintiff-defendant's preparatory negligence should be irrelevant.

20.
See id.
21.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 cmt. h (2010).
22.
Id.
23.
Again, the preparatory negligence itself almost invariably increases,
however slightly, the odds that the performance was negligent and thus provides at least
some evidence of negligent performance. Even in the Restatement's example of the
defendant drunken driver who was rear ended, the fact that the defendant driver sitting
in his car was drunk arguably possesses some slight probative value in showing he
performed his driving negligently. His drunkenness, for instance, tended to make it
more likely that he did not react with ordinary care to being rear ended, and his poor
reaction (i.e., his poor driving) may have intensified his collision with the plaintiff
driver in front of him. Nevertheless, as discussed below, I would admit this preparatory
negligence as evidence of negligent performance only when other threshold evidence
suggests that defendant's performance was negligent.
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When the result is not within the risk, when, that is, plaintiffs injury
does not stem from one of the risks for which we deem defendant
negligent, defendant's negligence should be deemed inconsequential.2
As Shakespeare said of a malicious thought that never materialized into
behavior, such a thought should be ignored as having "perish'd by the
way." 25 Therefore, a plaintiff who proves only preparatory negligence
should never reach the jury. The courts have rightly dismissed such
plaintiffs short of the jury, with the ground being usually no "proximate
cause,"26 but occasionally "no cause-in-fact" 27 or "no duty." 2' Tort law
should not consider the character, morality, or misconduct of parties
unless those29 characteristics have a sufficient connection to the harm that
occurred. ,
On the other hand, our language is rich enough for a court to
justify giving preparatory negligence dispositive significance-holding a
defendant prima facie liable because his preparatory negligence led to
plaintiffs injury-regardless of how the behavior that more
immediately caused plaintiffs injury was performed.3" The courts can
24.
Professor Wex Malone referred to a "universally accepted proposition that
courts will ignore" behavior that is only deemed negligent because it creates
unreasonable risks unrelated to "the type of risk that produced the injury in question."
Wex S. Malone, Contrasting Images of Torts-The Judicial Personality of Justice
Traynor, 13 STAN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1961).
25.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act 5, sc. 1, 1. 454, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (W. J. Craig ed., 1964).
26.
E.g., Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 198-99 (N.Y. 1926); see also Enis
v. Ba-Call Bldg. Corp., 639 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1980) (no proximate cause); Fox v.
Bartholf,374 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 1979) (no proximate cause).
27.
E.g., Massey v. Wright, 447 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 1984) (no cause-in-fact);
Snapp v. Harrison,699 So. 2d 567 (Miss. 1997) (no cause-in-fact).
E.g., Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995) (no duty); Scovill v.
28.
City of Astoria, 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996) (no duty).
29.
To repeat, this reasoning precludes prima facie liability for all negligent
entrusters, enablers, or facilitators unless the person who entrusted, enabled, or
facilitated also performed culpably or unreasonably dangerously. In such entrusting,
enabling, and facilitating cases, therefore, showing that this third party performed
culpably or unreasonably dangerously is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case.
Probably the least confusing way to express this in terms of the usual elements is to say
that absent sufficient evidence of such culpable or unreasonably dangerous performance
by the third person so entrusted, enabled, or facilitated, plaintiff has not established
proximate cause against the defendant entruster, enabler, or facilitator.
30.
Even those who attribute this "dispositive" significance to defendant's
preparatory negligence would allow the defendant a defense if defendant showed that
the same injury would have resulted had a more qualified person performed the
behavior. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, ComparingMedical Providers:A
First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1992).
Professors Twerski and Cohen accord dispositive significance to a doctor's attempt to
perform a procedure for which statistics show him to have a poor record of outcomes
compared to alternative doctors. Although they call for that attempt to lead to liability
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decry defendant's obvious negligence for attempting his activity
knowing it was unreasonably dangerous for him to do so.3" Tort
liability should help to deter culpable behavior such as attempting to
drive while drunk.32 The less drunken driving, the fewer car accidents
and injuries. The Learned Hand test for negligence, after all, easily
deems the costs of driving knowing one is drunk to outweigh the
benefits of doing so, at least when no emergency requires driving.33
In the enabling torts, the defendant negligently put a dangerous
instrumentality or opportunity into the hands of an irresponsible third
party thereby creating a foreseeable risk of harm to someone like the
plaintiff.3" Tort law should help suppress that negligence as well.
Courts can then emphasize the clear "but for" connection between
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury-by which, again, I mean
nothing more than the obvious fact that plaintiff would not have been
injured if defendant had not attempted to drive while drunk, attempted
to treat plaintiff medically without training, entrusted his car to the
irresponsible third-party driver, hired or retained the irresponsible
third-party employee, served the third-party drunk more drinks, or left
his car doors unlocked on a public street.35 Courts can finesse
without any showing of negligent performance of the procedure, they concede that the
doctor should be able to defend himself by showing performance by a better doctor
would have caused the same injury. Id.
31.
Johnson v. Bos. & M. R. R., 143 A. 516 (N.H. 1928) (condemning a
party for driving when unqualified to do so).
32.
The many examples of preparatory negligence that tort law may wish to
deter are suggested by the following behaviors performed while drunk by a defendant
who should know his drunken condition renders his attempt at performance
unreasonably dangerous: performing as an air traffic controller, performing surgery,
performing certain police duties, piloting a ship, or serving as a mountain-climbing
guide.
33.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965).
34.
E.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 153-54 (Colo. 1986) (discussing
wrongful death suit brought against drunken driver and police officers who released the
driver to the custody of his younger brother); Franklin v. Wilson, 422 P.2d 51, 51
(Colo. 1966) (discussing personal injury suit against contractor in which employee of
subcontractor entered construction site and was injured after falling from a ladder that
he was using without authorization).
35.
Readers of tort opinions may immediately respond that courts are
unanimous in agreeing on the insignificance of any negligence that merely puts the
parties into the place in time and space where the accident occurs. E.g., Berry v. Sugar
Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899) (declaring that negligent speeding that
coincidentally put a street car underneath a tree at the moment the tree fell has no
significance). While I enthusiastically support the approach in Berry, I believe
confusion is better avoided if, using the 'but for' test in a simple, factual sense, one
finds the 'but for' test satisfied in Berry and thus finds cause-in-fact there. The
negligent speeding in Berry should be deemed irrelevant on the ground of no proximate
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defendant's argument-that the risks created by his preparatory
negligence were not shown to have materialized-by describing those
risks more generally. They can then point out the statistical correlation
between defendant's preparatory negligence and those general risks.36
For example, the risks created by a defendant's preparatory negligence
in driving drunk could be described not as "culpable driving that injures
another" but more generally as "involvement in a car accident that
injures another." 37 Defendant's preparatory negligence in driving drunk
has increased the likelihood of defendant being involved in a "car
accident that injures another," at least as a statistical matter. 3" And of
course the drunken driving risk of "involvement in a car accident that
injures another" can be said to be the very risk that has materialized in
the plaintiff's injury.
So a tort student may argue: "Tort law should stand against
defendant's preparatory negligence by imposing liability to suppress
cause because the risks from speeding did not increase, and were wholly unrelated to,
the type of risk (i.e., the risk of a tree falling on an object passing underneath) that
materialized. The argument made in this paragraph of text (an argument I reject) is that
preparatory negligence, in contrast to the speeding in Berry, is adequately related to the
type of risk that materialized in plaintiffs injury, and thus should be viewed as a
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. The argument thus supports giving preparatory
negligence dispositive significance.
36.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2009 DATA: ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2009), available at

http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811385.pdf (stating that "[i]n 2009, 10,839 people
were killed in alcohol-impaired-driving crashes," accounting for nearly one-third
(32%) of all traffic-related deaths in the United States).
37.
E.g., Stinson v. Daniel, 414 S.W.2d 7 (Tenn. 1967) (finding the risks
adequately related and supporting the dispositive approach).
38.
1 am not aware of any statistics which actually show that drunk drivers are
involved in more accidents per mile driven that injure others than are sober drivers. But
in light of the very high percent of accidents that involve drunken drivers, that must be
the case. Of course the degree of drunkenness can vary considerably and would
certainly bear on the likelihood the driver performed his driving negligently.
The tendency of drunken driving to increase car accident injuries in which no
negligence was shown has been said to create a "causal link" between drunk driving
and these injuries. Guido Calabresi, ConcerningCause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975). According to the Third
Restatement of Torts, showing such a "causal link" between the negligence of driving
while drunk and plaintiffs injury will not suffice for imposing liability on the drunken
driver, a result with which I agree. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. h (2010). But the Restatement also suggests
that showing such a causal link between drunken driving and the injury should only
rarely provide admissible evidence that a drunk-driving defendant was performing his
driving negligently. See id. With that result, I disagree. I believe that when there is
threshold evidence that defendant was driving negligently, the fact that defendant was
drunk while driving should often constitute admissible evidence to show that
negligence.
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that negligence. Doing so will reduce accidents and injuries.
Defendant's preparatory negligence, after all, foreseeably subjected
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. But for defendant's
preparatory negligence, plaintiff would not have been injured.
Moreover it is not true that the risks for which we deem defendant's
preparatory behavior negligent are wholly unrelated to the risks that
materialized in plaintiff's injury. On the contrary, the risks created by
that preparatory negligence increased the risks that materialized. Drunk
drivers and car thieves are involved in more car accidents that injure
others per mile driven than are sober and lawful drivers." The ex-cons
the defendant negligently hired or retained are probably more likely to
be involved in work-related incidents injuring others than are
employees without a criminal record. Medical treatment by impostor
doctors probably yields a higher rate of bad results than medical
treatment by the trained and licensed. And who would seriously
maintain that passengers in an airplane piloted by an impostor are no
more likely to be injured than if the pilot was trained and licensed?40 In
this sense defendant's preparatory negligence has increased the
likelihood of the (generally defined) risk that resulted in injury to
plaintiff and hence should be deemed a proximate cause of that
injury. ,,4
39.
Cornelius J. Peck, An Exercise Based upon EmpiricalData: Liability for
Harm Caused by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 909, 915 (showing that
drivers of stolen cars are involved in more accidents per mile driven that injure others
than are drivers who own the car or who have the permission of the owner to drive);
see also Hill v. Yaskin, 380 A.2d 1107, 1110 (N.J. 1977) ("[T]he accident rate for
stolen cars is 47 times ...the [accident] rate for the general public.") (citing DAVID
BARRY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
AUTO ANTI-THEFT DEVICES app. B (1975)).
40.
Again, I am not aware of any statistics actually showing the rate of
involvement in job-related injuries to others of ex-con employees compared to other
employees or of impostor doctors or pilots compared to trained and licensed doctors or
pilots.
41.
Two tort scholars support giving preparatory negligence this dispositive
significance, at least in medical malpractice. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil
B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look at the New Era of Medical
Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1992). The authors would hold prima facie liable a
defendant doctor whose preparatory negligence lay in performing a medical procedure
with the knowledge that his record of outcomes for that procedure was significantly and
substantially worse than the record of outcomes of alternative doctors. Id. at 13-18.
The defendant doctor would be prima facie liable for his patient's injury without regard
to his performance of the procedure. Id. at 17-18. His negligent decision to perform
the procedure would suffice for such liability. Id. Nevertheless, the authors allow the
defendant doctor to avoid liability by showing the same injury to the plaintiff would
have occurred if the procedure were performed by a "fully competent practitioner"
(i.e., an alternative doctor with a better record of outcomes). Id. at 26. Such a
showing, the authors claim, would negate cause-in-fact. Id.
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On such reasoning, courts may adopt the dispositive approach to
preparatory negligence and find defendant prima facie liable with no

insistence that plaintiff address how the drunk driver, car thief, ex-con
employee, or impostor doctor or pilot actually performed in plaintiffs

case. 42 In effect, defendant's preparatory negligence renders him strictly
liable for any injuries from his activity.
This reasoning gains persuasive power when the preparatory
negligence violates a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation
(particularly a criminal one), the command of which the court has

decided should displace the usual negligence test of "ordinary care.,41

For the court now to deny the preparatory negligence any significance
arguably insults the judgment of the legislators, city council members,
or administrators.' In Brown v. Shyne, for example, the legislators
who passed the criminal statute against practicing medicine without a
license plainly hoped the statute would help to assure the people of New
York that anyone treating them medically would have studied at

42.
In the negligent entrustment, enabling, and facilitation cases, a practical
reason for the law ignoring how the injurious activity was performed is that the
performer will often be a judgment-proof third party not before the court. The third
party may not even be identified. Nellsch v. Westland Ford, Inc., 646 P.2d 736, 737
(Utah 1982) (explaining how defendant negligently left keys in ignition, car thief drove
negligently and injured plaintiff but the thief was never identified). If the approach
recommended here is adopted, the plaintiff must establish culpable performance by the
third party that caused plaintiffs injury in order to satisfy the proximate cause element
of his prima facie case against the negligent entruster, enabler, or facilitator.
43.
Most statutes specify requirements for performing an activity, rather than
requirements for attempting performance. A maximum speed statute for drivers is an
example. When these statutes are violated the issues discussed in the Essay do not arise.
The literature on when a court should "borrow," as it were, such a legislative measure
to displace the "ordinary care" test as the test for negligence in a particular case is

legion. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL

& EMOTIONAL

HARM

§ 14 cmts. f & g (2005) (stating that for legislation to set the standard for ordinary care,
the plaintiff must be within the class of persons the legislation meant to protect and the
risk that materialized must be one of the risks the legislation was designed to reduce);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 286, 874A (1965); see also Clarence Morris, The

Relation of CriminalStatutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REV. 453 (1933); Charles
0. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 622 (1951); Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L.
REv. 317 (1914). Admittedly, deciding whether to "borrow" a legislative measure as
the test for negligence will sometimes entail assessing the very issue with which this
Essay is dealing, namely, the significance of preparatory negligence.
44.
To be sure, the legislature's passage of a penal statute does not indicate
clearly the legislature's desire to change the mode of determining civil liability. The
Second Restatement of Torts persuasively rejected the claim that Lehman's approach

insulted the legislature. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 285-288 (1979).
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medical school and have passed the requisite exams. 45 Lehman's
approach ignores the opportunity to use tort law to reinforce that
assurance and further this legislative mission. One need not agree with
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes-that the primary goal of torts is to
supplement the criminal law -to give greater significance than
Lehman gave to the defendant's violation of the legislature's criminal
decree.47 Arguably Lehman's approach collides with the principle of
statutory interpretation, which enjoins courts to interpret legislation

45.
In fact the New York legislators attempted to reverse the result in Brown
the next year with a statute, since updated. The McKinney's ConsolidatedLaws of New
York Annotated provide:
(d) Proof of negligence; unauthorized practice of medicine. In any action
for damages for personal injuries or death against a person not authorized to
practice medicine . . for any act or acts constituting the practice of
medicine, when such act or acts were a competent producing proximate or
contributing cause of such injuries or death, the fact that such person
practiced medicine without being so authorized shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of negligence.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKINNEY 2003). Because Lehman's opinion can be read as
holding that the defendant's failure to comply with the statute was not a proximate
cause of plaintiffs injury, this legislative attempt, by limiting admissibility to cases
where proximate cause exists, may fail to reverse the result in Brown.
46.
See generally 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 161-62 (1881).
Professor Clarence Morris also supported this goal: "However, it is notorious that the
criminal law is not particularly efficient, and [tort] liability based on fault is a desirable
complement to the criminal law if conduct which is [unreasonably] risky is to be
discouraged." Morris, supra note 43, at 458 n. 11.
47.
Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 198 (N.Y. 1926). There are many
arguments in support of Lehman's refusal to give the violation of this statute any
significance. Lehman could have pointed out that the statute is a penal one and the
penal remedy, the only remedy mentioned in the statute, can still be imposed. Lehman
could have disparaged the statute as special interest legislation (i.e., an example of the
American Medical Association using the legislature for protection against the
competition of chiropractors like defendant). On this ground he could have claimed,
however implausibly, that the statute was not a safety statute at all. That a statute is
designed, at least in part, for safety purposes is a universal requirement for attributing
any significance in a tort case to its violation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. c (2010). Lehman could also have
flatly rejected the Holmesian notion that the primary goal of torts is to supplement the
criminal law, positing instead that torts as a common law subject is primarily a matter
of private law. Because of his view of torts as private law, Lehman could have also
emphasized the lack of evidence that defendant misrepresented his training and
qualifications to the plaintiff patient. Apparently the defendant never said to plaintiff
that he had attended medical school or obtained an M.D. See Brown, 151 N.E. at 202.
Defendant's honesty and forthrightness on these matters show that his treating Mrs.
Brown was not, according to Lehman, a "private wrong." 1d. at 199. Finally, Lehman
could have pointed to the relatively modest criminal penalty for violation of the statute
and claimed that giving the violation any relevance in a tort case would link a
comparatively small fault to disproportionately heavy liability.
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liberally so as to further and to fulfill the legislative purpose. 4' Thus,
the legislative measure-by emphasizing the defendant's clear, and
perhaps flagrant, preparatory negligence-helps plaintiff distract the
court's attention from whether the behavior that more immediately
caused plaintiff's injury was performed negligently. 4"
II. PART Two

The legal realists have long taught that the richness of our
language enables courts to write defensible opinions that reach opposite
conclusions. ° So there is nothing exceptional in finding that students

48.
E.g., Gregory, supra note 5, at 629 ("Hence, a court should liberally
interpret the legislative intent to make it include the avoidance of situations not
specifically foreseen but closely allied to those which the legislature had actually
intended to cover.").
49.
To be sure fewer cases accord such dispositive significance to defendant's
preparatory negligence than accord no significance. See, e.g., Duty v. E. Coast Tender
Serv., Inc., 660 F.2d 933, 938, 942 (4th Cir. 1981) (dispositive significance); Johnson
v. Bos. & M. R. R., 143 A. 516, 517, 523 (N.H. 1928) (dispositive significance);
Stinson v. Daniel, 414 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tenn. 1967) (dispositive significance); see also
Nw. Door Co. v. Lewis Inv. Co., 180 P. 495, 501 (Or. 1919). In Beauchamp v.
Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co., the defendant employer violated a criminal statute that
prohibited hiring underage workers. 95 N.E. 204, 204 (Ill. 1911). Those workers were
then injured on the job and sued their employer in tort for their job-related injuries. Id.
While the statute says nothing about its significance in a civil case, the court in this
civil case uniformly adopted the statutory prohibition against hiring the under-aged as
the ground for finding the employer negligent. Id. at 207. The court then imposed
liability on the employer (or allowed the jury to do so) without any inquiry into whether
the underage worker's injury came about through the on-the-job negligence of the
employer or of another employee for whose negligence the employer would be
vicariously liable. Id. No matter how innocent the employer and his other employees
were in their on-the-job performance, the preparatory negligence of the employer in
hiring the underage worker in the first place sufficed for liability. Id.
Jewish law tends to grant preparatory negligence dispositive significance. Under
halacha (Jewish law) a doctor who fails during treatment to defer to or consult with
more experienced and skillful colleagues who are readily available becomes liable for
any subsequent injury regardless of how the doctor performed the treatment. Ramat
Rachel No. 22, in LEGAL REsPONSES OF Tzrrz ELIEZER 5 (1957) (s.v. "u'venogeah").
The dispositive approach to preparatory negligence was also taken by Justice
Traynor in his dissent in Stickel v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 195 P.2d 416, 424 (Cal.
1948) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs negligence in driving while
drunk constitutes contributory negligence that bars recovery regardless of how she was
driving).
50.
See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 60, 67-68 (1956) (the richness of our language allows defensible opinions to be
written on any side of the cause-in-fact issue); see also Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory
and JudicialLogic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 239 (1950); Morris Raphael Cohen, The Process
of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REv. 161, 171-72 (1914); John Dewey, Logical
Method andLaw, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20, 24 (1924). The legal realist Karl Llewellyn
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can advance defensible but opposing opinions about the significance of
preparatory negligence. According to the legal realists, this fruitful
insight about the richness of our language should direct scholars to
consider the underlying, and often unmentioned, policy concerns that
have led the courts to opt for one conclusion, and its corresponding
legal opinion, rather than another.5 Following this pragmatic approach,
at least some legal realists discourage the search for cross-contextual
principles that would bring some conceptual order to an issue like the
significance of preparatory negligence." This ordering effort, the legal
realists insist, will inevitably disappoint.53 The real world, to our
bemusement and delight as well as chagrin, will not succumb. The

admitted that the number of defensible opinions was limited. KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 81 (1930) ("For while it is possible
to build a number of divergent logical ladders up out of the same cases and down again
to the same dispute, there are not so many that can be built defensibly. ").
51.
Modern tort casebooks suggest the policies bearing on the significance
accorded preparatory negligence include the following: (1) the judicial perception of the
egregiousness of the preparatory negligence; (2) the intensity of the judicial desire to
suppress the preparatory negligence; (3) the perceived dangerousness of the preparatory
negligence both absolutely and compared to better preparatory behavior; (4) the cost
and difficulty to the defendant of avoiding the preparatory negligence; (5) the closeness
of the fit between the preparatory negligence and the type of injury plaintiff suffered;
(6) the difficulty of establishing that defendant was negligent in his performance; (7) the
absence of a non-safety rationale for the legislation prohibiting the preparatory
behavior; and (8) the judicial perception of the relative ability to assess negligence of
two institutions, the legislature, which often has condemned the preparatory behavior,
and the jury, which is more able to evaluate the particular defendant's performance.
E.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (2009); see also Hudson v.
Craft, 204 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1949) ("[Tjhe controlling factor is whether or not the
expressed public policy [reflected in the legislation] is sufficiently urgent, explicit and
comprehensive."); Neil Komesar, InSearch of a GeneralApproach to Legal Analysis:
A ComparativeInstitutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1389-91 (1981) (the
judicial perception of the relative reliability of the legislature and the jury informs
judicial decisions); Malone, supra note 50, at 61 (policy concerns such as the intensity
of the judicial desire to suppress the negligence or the closeness of the fit between the
negligence and the type of injury to plaintiff drive the judicial treatment of even a
"fact" issue like cause-in-fact).
52.
For a summary of legal realism's slaying of conceptualism, see LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 10 (1986); see also KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19-61, 121-32, 178219 (1960); Dewey, supra note 50, at 26-27; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453-57 (1930); Glen 0.
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law.- Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REV. 713, 713-15 (1982). For an early dismissal of cross-contextual principles, albeit
in a different context, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. ").
53.
Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832-34 (1935).
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policy concerns actual cases cast before the courts will drive results and
mock the categorizations and generalizations that seem so sound in the
armchair.
With expectations duly lowered, I nevertheless hazard two general
rules regarding the significance of preparatory negligence. The first is
described immediately below. The second is described in Part III.
The first general rule is that preparatory negligence should never
be accorded the dispositive significance described above. A court may
be outraged by defendant's preparatory negligence. A court may see
that the legislature has condemned that negligence stridently.
Nevertheless, imposing liability without sufficient evidence that the
behavior that more immediately injured the plaintiff was performed
culpably or unreasonably dangerously does too much violence to the
common law's long insistence on a greater causal connection between
defendant's culpability and plaintiff's injury. 4
Preparatory negligence alone is an insufficient wrong vis-A-vis the
plaintiff to warrant the heavy consequence of tort liability. Defendant's
apparently55 faultless performance discharges his moral responsibility to
the plaintiff and should trump defendant's preparatory negligence.
Giving preparatory negligence dispositive significance denigrates the
defendant's successful effort to overcome or compensate for his poor
preparation and to pull himself together in order to perform his activity
with ordinary care. Whatever defendant's culpability in attempting his
behavior in the first place, a court will not justify imposing liability by
saying, in effect, that it does not care how the behavior that more
immediately injured the plaintiff was performed. Nor should a court's
sense of justice be offended when a defendant, guilty of preparatory
negligence, avoids liability simply through random good luck, namely,
the random good luck that led defendant or some enabled third party to
perform their activity with ordinary care. The Third Restatement of
Torts was sound in saying the injured plaintiffs case against the
defendant drunken driver who was rear ended should not reach the jury
absent sufficient evidence that the activity which more immediately
54.
This insistence is more helpfully thought of as being reflected in the
proximate cause element, not the cause-in-fact element. Of course, those advancing
more ambitious goals for torts, such as loss-spreading or wealth distribution, show little
concern with the insufficient causal connection. They cannot be expected to support this
first rule. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Others have
pointed out the undesirable implications of attempting to achieve these more ambitious
goals. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988).
55.
This Essay deals with cases in which plaintiff, although clearly showing
defendant's preparatory negligence, has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
defendant's negligent performance. Thus, plaintiff should lose on directed verdict if
defendant's negligent performance is deemed an element of liability.
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injured the plaintiff, in this instance the defendant's driving, was
performed negligently.6
It follows that the plaintiff injured because the defendant has
negligently entrusted another to perform an activity should also fail to
reach the jury absent sufficient evidence that the activity was performed
by the other culpably or unreasonably dangerously. 7 Similarly, the
employer who has negligently hired or retained an obviously dangerous
employee should prevail as a matter of law absent sufficient evidence
that the employee behaved culpably or unreasonably dangerously in
injuring the plaintiff. Likewise, the defendant car owner who
negligently left his car unlocked or otherwise negligently facilitated the
car's theft should prevail against the plaintiff injured by that thief
absent evidence that the thief drove culpably or unreasonably
dangerously. And the defendant who negligently served alcohoi to one
already drunk and about to drive should prevail against the plaintiff
injured by that drunken driver absent evidence that the drunken driver
drove culpably or unreasonably dangerously. Once again, the least
confusing ground for explaining this result is that absent evidence
showing that the activity that more immediately injured the plaintiff was
performed culpably or unreasonably dangerously, defendant's negligent
entrustment, negligent hiring, or negligent retention was not a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.
Denying dispositive significance to preparatory negligence also
means Justice Lehman was correct in Brown v. Shyne when he deemed
the trial court's jury instruction erroneous.5 That instruction provided:
If the defendant attempted to treat the plaintiff and to adjust
the vertebre in her spine when he did not possess the
requisite knowledge and skill as prescribed by the [licensing]
statute to know what was proper and necessary to do under
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
56.
§ 14 cmt. h (2010).
Once again, "unreasonably dangerous" is needed to cover the possibility
57.
that the person entrusted behaves in an unreasonably dangerous way but cannot be said
to be culpable. For example, a defendant who entrusts his car to one he knows to be so
insane as to be an unreasonably dangerous driver should be liable when the insane
driver drives in an unreasonably dangerous manner, even if the driver, because of his
insanity, would not be deemed culpable. See Breunig v. Am. FamilyIns. Co., 45 Wis.
2d 536, 543-44, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970) (stating in dicta that the insane will not be
held negligent or liable if their mental illness affects their ability to understand and
appreciate their duty to drive with ordinary care or affects their ability to control their
car in an ordinarily prudent manner). If the insane driver drives properly, and another
is injured nevertheless, the defendant's negligent entrustment of the driver should not
be deemed a proximate cause of the other's injury.
See 151 N.E. 197, 199 (N.Y. 1926).
58.
HARM
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the circumstances, or how to do it, even if he did know what
to do, you can find him negligent.59
Lehman correctly saw that the instruction erred because it allowed
the jury to impose liability on the defendant merely because of his
preparatory negligence in attempting plaintiffs treatment.'
The
instruction did not require the jury to find anything amiss with
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff him or herself.6
This first rule also calls for rejecting the action supported by
Aaron Twerski and Neil Cohen and described in a note above. 62 If
provider-specific records of outcomes show that a doctor's outcomes
from performing a particular procedure, like open-heart surgery, are
significantly and substantially worse than the outcomes of alternative
doctors, Twerski and Cohen would deem the doctor liable for all
injuries that come from the doctor thereafter attempting the procedure
(knowing his relatively poor record of outcomes). The defendant-doctor
would be prima facie liable for his patient's injury even when the
plaintiff-patient fails to produce any evidence of something amiss with
the doctor's performance of the procedure. His decision to perform the
procedure-a procedure that all agree is medically indicated-would be
deemed negligent and would suffice for such liability. In effect, the
doctor with a poor record of outcomes would be subject to strict
liability when he performed the procedure.
To be sure, the authors allow the defendant-doctor to avoid
liability by showing the same injury to the plaintiff would have
occurred if the procedure were performed by a "fully competent
practitioner" (i.e., a doctor with a significantly better record of
outcomes). 63 Such a showing, the authors say, would negate cause-infact, thereby constituting a defense. 6' However the authors take care to
emphasize that this defense requires more from the defendant doctor
than a showing that his performance was free from negligence.65 After
all the authors insist that the negligence or breach element of the
patient's case is shown merely by the doctor's attempt at the procedure.66
Hence the doctor can only avoid liability by negating cause in fact.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 198.
See id. at 199.
See id.
See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 41, at 11-22.
Id. at 14 n.23.
Id. at 19 n.33.
See id. at 18-19 & n.33.
See id.
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The authors then clarify that as a practical matter few, if any, doctors
will ever be able to establish this defense.67
The doctor's decision to perform the procedure knowing of his
poor record of outcomes, if it is indeed negligent as the authors claim,
is a quintessential example of preparatory negligence. So when the
authors insist that such negligence warrants liability for all injuries from
the procedure,68 without any evidence of how the procedure was
performed, they are according preparatory negligence with what this
Essay calls dispositive significance. They are saying the plaintiff-patient
should reach the jury merely by putting into evidence the providerspecific record of outcomes. Then, based on these statistics, plaintiffs
attorney may ask the jury to find that the defendant-doctor was
negligent (i.e., committed malpractice) by attempting to perform the
procedure instead of sending the patient to a doctor with a better record
of outcomes. While the authors also interpret the informed-consent
doctrine to compel the doctor to inform his patients of his poor record
of outcomes, they do not limit the doctor's obligation to the giving of
this (humbling, if not humiliating) information.6 9 Even if a patient,
upon being told these statistics, prefers to have the doctor perform the
procedure, the doctor is nonetheless negligent and liable to the patient if
the doctor goes ahead. Although the authors do not address the point,
their approach logically suggests that even a patient who enjoys a good
result can sue for the wrong done to him by the doctor's negligent
attempt at the procedure, with the good result merely reducing the
amount of damages the patient should collect.
This description of the action Twerski and Cohen propose suggests
the shortcomings generally of according preparatory negligence
dispositive significance. Allowing liability based only on preparatory
negligence shows a breathtaking disregard for the performance of the
doctor in treating this particular patient. Admittedly, proving the
doctor's performance negligent may present problems for the plaintiff.
But when the plaintiff cannot fault that performance-when, as far as
the evidence shows, the defendant has somehow overcome the poor
odds surrounding his attempt and performed properly-imposing
liability because of that attempt alone treats the defendant unjustly and
unduly offends our notions of proximate cause. The negligent attempt
should not trump the apparently non-negligent performance. On the
contrary, the apparently non-negligent performance has nullified the
risks created by the negligent attempt. In the end it is the proper
performance which the law most tries to incentivize, and which the
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 26 & n.40.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 26-33.
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patient desires, not any benefit the patient derives from his doctor
possessing a good record of outcomes.
Twerski and Cohen also ignore the severe effect of their proposed
action on the doctors to whom it applies. Their action in effect subjects
doctors with a poor record of outcomes for a procedure to strict liability
should they continue to attempt the procedure. 7" Doctors may have
devoted their careers to the procedure. They may have spent years
training and working to obtain the opportunity to perform it. Twerski
and Cohen's examples make clear that their action will apply to highrisk procedures that may lead to severely harmful results despite the
procedure being performed impeccably. Hence, Twerski and Cohen's
rule threatens to increase dramatically the liability of the specialists to
whom their rule applies. Indeed, under their rule the publication of a
poor record of outcomes might sound the death knell of a specialist's
career. What malpractice liability insurer would willingly offer a policy
to such a specialist?
According preparatory negligence dispositive significance,
therefore, may lead to tort law usurping the role of the legislators and
administrators historically charged with identifying the doctors deemed
qualified to attempt medical procedures. Because Twerski and Cohen's
rule could impose such a prohibitive amount of liability, it also offends
our notions of fair opportunity in that it seizes on one criterion alonerecord of outcomes-for, in effect, selecting those who will be given an
opportunity to perform a procedure. It ignores that legislators,
administrators, and patients might want to consider other criteria about
a doctor before deciding whether he should be allowed to perform a
procedure, such as his ethical record, his success during simulations,
examinations, or training, his bedside manner, his relationship with the
patient, his location (especially his willingness to locate to rural areas),
and even his costs and his generous approach to collecting. Regulation
through tort liability would displace not only market forces but the
wishes of traditional regulators as well.
Nor do Twerski and Cohen offer any method for a doctor with a
poor record of outcomes from his early years to start afresh. 7' A
doctor's improvement may be such that his current and future
performance of the procedure offers as good a chance of a positive
outcome as any doctor would offer. But Twerski and Cohen's rule does
not allow a way for a doctor saddled by a poor early record to establish
this and thereby avoid being deemed prima facie negligent. True, such
70.
See id. at 11-22.
71.
The Twerski and Cohen approach makes doctors who are just starting the
rising part of the learning curve extremely dependent on the results of their beginning
performances.
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a doctor could in theory pay tort damages to his patients until his record
of outcomes finally improves, although Twerski and Cohen do not
indicate the time period over which a doctor's record is to be assessed
for this purpose. Once the doctor is judged by his improved record, he
presumably would again be prima facie liable only for negligent
performance. But no malpractice liability insurer is likely to stay with
the doctor through his years of strict liability. And not many doctors
will possess deep-enough pockets to stay the course. Fewer still will be
willing to subject themselves to such an ordeal. Put simply, the Twerski
and Cohen rule forecloses any doctor comeback.72
In sum, preparatory negligence should never be accorded what I
call dispositive significance. 73 That is, plaintiff should never establish a
prima facie case merely by showing that defendant engaged in
preparatory negligence and but for defendant's preparatory negligence
plaintiffs injury would probably have been avoided. Courts should
reject Twerski and Cohen's proposed action. That action, by allowing
the plaintiff-patient to establish a prima facie case on the mere showing
that the doctor's past outcomes were relatively poor overall, imposes
liability on a doctor regardless of how he has performed his treatment
of the plaintiff.
III. PART THREE
The second general rule I propose regarding the significance of
preparatory negligence is that such negligence, though never sufficient
in itself to establish a prima facie case, should presumptively be
admitted as some evidence of defendant's negligent (or otherwise
culpable)74 performance whenever other evidence, what might be called
threshold evidence, suggests that defendant's performance was
negligent.75 In other words, once plaintiff adduces other threshold

As discussed infra, the provider-specific statistics, which the rule
72.
Twerski and Cohen accord this dispositive effect, suffer the vulnerability of
statistical evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
73.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
The proposed general rule would apply to claims based on recklessness
74.
intent as well as negligence. For brevity, I refer here to all three levels of culpability
"negligence."

of
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75.
As indicated supra note 23, defendant's preparatory negligence may
possess probative value in showing defendant's performance was negligent regardless of
whether plaintiff adduces other evidence of defendant's negligent performance. But in
the absence of any other evidence of defendant's negligent performance, the probative
value of preparatory negligence in showing negligent performance will often be so
slight that a presumption against admitting it into evidence is warranted.
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evidence of defendant's negligent performance,"6 defendant's
preparatory behavior should be admitted as further evidence of that
negligent performance. 77 Whether a plaintiffs claim of negligent
performance reaches a jury should depend on whether the evidentiary
value of plaintiffs preparatory negligence in showing defendant's
negligent performance in combination with plaintiffs other evidence of
defendant's negligent performance satisfies the sufficiency-of-theevidence test.
Thus, Justice Lehman erred in Brown when he kept out of
evidence entirely the fact that the defendant had never attended medical
school or received the required training.78 We can assume with Lehman
that the negligence issue in Brown was whether the defendant's
performance of his treatment of Mrs. Brown was negligent in that it did
not conform to the customary practice of medical doctors. The bad
result of defendant's treatment-plaintiff's paralysis-may have
provided at least a little evidence that defendant's performance failed to
meet that standard. If it did, that bad result very likely amounted to the
threshold evidence the rule proposed here would require. Because
defendant's failure to attend medical school further reduced the
probability that his performance met that standard, defendant's
preparatory negligence in treating the plaintiff without such training
should have been admitted.79 It is no answer to say, as Lehman did, that
76.
Naturally, the necessary threshold evidence of defendant's negligent
performance need not amount to sufficient evidence of defendant's negligent
performance for plaintiff to reach the jury. For example, the circumstances of
plaintiffs injury need not justify a res ipsa loquitur inference of defendant's negligent
performance. Those circumstances may possess much less probative value in showing
defendant's negligent performance and yet still supply the necessary threshold evidence
of negligent performance. Generally, other evidence of negligent performance will
constitute the threshold needed to admit defendant's preparatory negligence whenever
that evidence renders the claim of defendant's negligent performance non-frivolous
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly if an impostor pilot
crashes a plane, and the crash investigation concludes pilot error was one of the
possible explanations, that investigation would constitute ample threshold evidence.
77.
It is important to keep the issue here, whether defendant's preparatory
negligence should be admissible evidence of defendant's negligent performance,
separate from the much discussed issue of the effect a jurisdiction should give to a
defendant's violation of a statutory, regulatory, or administrative command that has
been adopted as the test for negligence. Conventional wisdom identifies three possible
effects: negligence per se, presumption of negligence, and mere evidence of negligence.
This Essay does not concern the choice between these effects. For a discussion of that
issue, and especially a discussion of when and why defendant's violation should
constitute only evidence of negligence, see Charles L. B. Lowndes, Civil Liability
Createdby CriminalLegislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932).
78.
Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 198 (N.Y. 1926).
79.
Id. (pointing out that defendant's treatment resulted in plaintiffs
paralysis).
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the defendant-chiropractor might still have performed the treatment
properly.8 The evidence issue always turns on probabilities about
defendant's performance, and defendant's preparatory negligence
typically raises the probability that his performance was negligent.
This second general rule supports the Third Restatement of Tort's
position that the preparatory negligence of the defendant-driver in
opting to drive while drunk should not be admissible when that driver is
rear ended. 8' In the Restatement hypothetical the defendant drunk driver
was merely waiting in traffic, and there was no evidence that the
performance of defendant's driving was negligent.8 2 In line with the
rule I suggest, although not expressly embracing it, the Third
Restatement goes on to observe that occasionally the defendant's
preparatory negligence should be admitted as evidence that the
defendant performed negligently.83 And the examples they give support
my claim that admissibility turns on whether there is other evidence of
defendant's negligent performance.84 Thus, the editors agree that the
flat exclusion of preparatory negligence from evidence is unwarranted.
The limitations of this second rule, and a reason I only call for a
presumption of admissibility, become apparent when the rule is applied
to the provider-specific records of outcomes discussed by Twerski and
Cohen.85 Those scholars would grant dispositive significance to the
preparatory negligence of a doctor attempting a procedure when the
doctor's record of outcomes for that procedure is sufficiently poor-a
proposal I reject. 86 Under my second rule, however, once the plaintiffpatient produced some threshold evidence that the doctor performed the
procedure negligently, the doctor's poor record of outcomes would
presumptively be admitted as further evidence of such negligent
performance. Evidence scholars, however, could argue on several
grounds for overcoming any such presumption and refusing to admit
the outcome records. Accordingly, the value of this preparatory
negligence as evidence of negligence performance deserves a brief
review.87
80.
Id. at 198-99.
81.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
HARaM § 14 cmt. h (2010).
82.
Id.
83.
See id.
84.
See id. (giving the example of a motorcyclist whose
negligence lay in cycling despite failing his cycling test and whose cycling
evidence of negligent performance).
85.
See Twerski & Cohen, supranote 41, at 34.
86.
See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
87.
This discussion of the evidence issue largely tracks that
Rheingold. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Admissibility of Evidence in
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Federal Rule of Evidence 401 would seem to favor admission. It
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."" s Plainly a poor record of outcomes would seem to have a
"tendency" to make defendant's performance more likely negligent.
On the other hand, a poor record of outcomes admitted to show
defendant's negligent performance in plaintiff's case suffers the

infirmities of all "similarity evidence" (i.e., evidence of what a
defendant does generally being admitted to show what defendant did on

a specific occasion). Evidence of other crimes a criminal defendant
committed offered to show defendant committed the crime for which he
is charged is the classic example of similarity evidence.89 However high
the statistical correlation between those committing the other crimes

and those committing the crime in question, Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), and its state law equivalents, exclude other-crimes evidence
when offered "to show action in conformity therewith."' Especially in
civil cases, however, courts have often found some other ground for
admitting similarity evidence despite Rule 404(b). 9
A further argument against the admission of a defendant doctor's
poor record of outcomes arises from Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
its state equivalents.92 The argument lies in the possible prejudice to
defendant created by admitting his poor record of outcomes. The fear is

Cases: The Performance Records of Practitioners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 76-78
(1992).
88.
FED. R. EvwD. 401 (2006).
2003)
See, e.g., People v. Donoho, 788 N.E.2d 707, 716-18 (I11.
89.
(discussing whether prior sexual offenses provide admissible evidence that defendant
committed the sexual offense charged).
90.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.").
M. C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41
91.
IOWA L. REV. 325, 326 (1956) (other grounds for admitting similarity evidence); see
also FED. R. EvID. 405(b) (specific instances of conduct sometimes admissible); FED.
R. EvID. 406 (evidence of habit admissible to show conforming behavior); Loughan v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1985) (mechanic's
practice of carrying cooler of beer admissible to show his likely drinking on the job);
Rivera v. Anilesh, 869 N.E.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. 2007) (dentist's routine admissible to
show dentist's behavior).
FED. R. EvID. 403 (stating that the court may exclude relevant evidence
92.
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). State equivalents
include Iowa Evidence Rule 5.403 and Ohio Evidence Rule 403. IOWA R. Evm. 5.403
(2009); OHIo R. Evm. 403 (LexisNexis 2001).
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that the jury will give too much weight to these statistics especially if
the jury has difficulty deciding whether the doctor's performance in
plaintiffs case was negligent.
No doubt, some instances of preparatory negligence should be
excluded on this ground. An example would be driving without having
renewed one's license in a state where the requirements for renewal
evince some safety purpose and serve as some filter against continued
licensing of unsafe drivers.93 Even though this preparatory negligence
should not be disregarded on the ground of being wholly unrelated to
safety or to the risk of negligent driving, this preparatory negligence
may increase so slightly the probability that defendant was driving
negligently in this particular case that its probative value is de mmnims.
In contrast, I assume that the preparatory negligence of driving drunk
increases the probability of defendant driving negligently much more.
Whether any preparatory negligence is admissible under Rule 403 will
naturally enlist the judge's common sense.
These considerations and others bear on whether to admit into
evidence the outcomes records that Twerski and Cohen accord such
dispositive significance. Even if these records are admitted, defendant's
counsel can attack their probative value in showing defendant's
negligent performance on the same grounds statistical evidence can be
attacked generally. Briefly, defense counsel can point out:
1) errors in the collection of the data and math errors in the
data's manipulation, unrelated to whatever theories are
involved;
2) bias errors-failure to consider factors that may confound
the numbers... ;
3) demonstration of internal contradictions, such as a great
year-to-year variability of performance ... ; and
4) lack of significant differences...
how many standard
94
deviations would be required?
Although those undertaking the studies and reporting the statistical
results of doctor outcomes certainly strove to account for all measurable
variables and satisfy the highest standards of risk analysis,95 their
studies do not eliminate the possibility that a doctor's poor record of

93.
E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 483.384 (2011) (license renewal requires an eye
exam or report from an optometrist).
94.
Rheingold, supranote 87, at 79.
95.
The study appears in Edward L. Hannan et al., Adult Open Heart Surgery
in New York State: An Analysis of Risk Factors and Hospital Mortality Rates, 264
JAMA 2768 (1990).
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outcomes stems from the doctor's focus on patients with especially high
risk conditions. Nor do the studies consider the possibility, for
example, that some immeasurable but observable feature of a patient
signals to some doctors whether the patient's condition is high or low
risk, and thereby enables those doctors to select for the procedure only
the low risk. Furthermore, the studies do not consider the possibility
that the record of outcomes-which constitutes the starting point for the
studies-may be influenced by the doctors themselves. Finally, the
doctor can argue that the plaintiff differed from his other patients in the
database, or that his practice differed in ways not studied.
CONCLUSION

A student's effort to build a mental framework for analyzing torts
often hits a wall when the student encounters the preparatory negligence
issue in a case like Brown v. Shyne. Assuming the untutored
defendant's attempt to treat the plaintiff medically was negligent, if not
even more culpable, what significance should courts accord that
negligence? When a driver is involved in a car accident, what
significance should attend the negligence of the driver in opting to drive
while drunk? The element-by-element framework of duty, breach,
cause in-fact based on the "but for" test, and proximate cause fails to
yield an obvious or definitive answer.
This Essay offers a pair of conceptual, cross-contextual rules that
should at least provide a starting point. When, as in the Restatement
example of the drunken driver who was rear ended, there is no other
evidence suggesting defendant's performance was culpable, defendant's
drunkenness while attempting to drive, and his preparatory negligence
generally, should neither count as a basis for liability in itself nor be
admitted as evidence of defendant's negligent performance.
But once there is threshold evidence that defendant's performance
was negligent then automatically excluding defendant's preparatory
negligence from evidence can no longer be justified. Rather, a court
may rationally conclude that the probative value of defendant's
preparatory negligence in showing defendant's negligent performance
warrants its admission on that issue. Whether plaintiff has presented a
prima facie case should depend on whether that evidence combined
with the other evidence of defendant's negligent performance satisfies
the usual "sufficiency of the evidence" test for submitting the issue of
defendant's negligent performance to the jury. The significance of
preparatory negligence should be neither greater nor less.
Granted, the legal realists leave us wary of such general
propositions. We doubt especially that general propositions will help us
solve the next hard case. We suspect instead that courts will refer to
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that welter of policy concerns that the legal realists suggest are more
likely decisive. Here these policies include, once again: (1) the judicial
perception of the egregiousness of the preparatory negligence, (2) the
intensity of the judicial desire to suppress the preparatory negligence,
(3) the perceived dangerousness of the preparatory negligence both
absolutely and compared to better preparatory behavior, (4) the cost
and difficulty to the defendant of avoiding the preparatory negligence,
(5) the closeness of the fit between the preparatory negligence and the
type of injury plaintiff suffered, (6) the difficulty of establishing that
defendant's performance was negligent, (7) the absence of a non-safety
rationale for any legislation prohibiting the preparatory behavior, and
(8) the judicial perception of the relative ability to assess negligence of
two institutions, the legislature, which probably condemned defendant's
preparatory negligence, and the jury, which is more able to evaluate
defendant's performance in the particular case.9 6 But our predictions
about what courts will actually consider in reaching their decisions does
not nullify the value of suggesting what they should.

96.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 51. The legal realist Karl Llewellyn would deem
determining the legal significance of preparatory negligence on these grounds a
"triumph of the felt needs of the case, with a consequent ignoring or reshaping of
doctrine to fit the result." KARL LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
SALES x-xi (1930).
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